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SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS 
     Presented is an explanation of the use of the Initial Criticality 
Assessment (ICA) technique, a triage process for prioritizing 
required Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEAs), for the 
European Service Module's main propulsion system's hot-fire 
test bed at White Sands New Mexico.  Rather than instinctively 
performing many FMEAs of subsystems, or one large system 
level FMEA where every subcomponent is analyzed, the ICA 
guided an informed analysis of only the hardware that had a 
large impact to hazards.  The low criticality hardware was 
documented via the ICA and no FMEA was performed; the 
work could then focus on the high criticality hardware.  Thus a 
savings of Program resources was achieved.  The experiences 
gained in creating these ICAs for this international 
collaborative project confirmed that the need for continuous 
communication across the technical teams is one of the greatest 
areas of emphasis. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
     The European Space Agency (ESA) is developing the 
European Service Module (ESM), with its primary contractor, 
Airbus Defence and Space in Germany, for delivery to the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  The 
module will be equipped with a total of 21 engines to support 
NASA’s Orion spacecraft: one U.S. Space Shuttle Orbital 
Maneuvering System-Engine (OMS-E), eight auxiliary 
thrusters and 12 smaller RCS (Reaction Control System) 
thrusters.  The main ESM propulsion system, used for large 
translational maneuvers, consists of one OMS-E.  Figure 1 
shows an exploded view of the major Orion components.  From 
right to left: the Launch Abort System (LAS), the Crew Module 
(CM), and the ESM.  At the extreme left, or the bottom, of the 
ESM, is visible the single exhaust nozzle of the OMS-E. 
     To qualify the design of the ESM propulsion subsystem 
(PSS) an all-steel Propulsion Qualification Module (PQM) 
structure is used to test the propulsion systems on Orion, 
including “hot firing” of the OMS engine, thrusters, and RCS.  
The PQM has been developed as a hot-fire test bed to be tested 
at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF).   One of the 
 
Figure 1: Orion Spacecraft Components Exploded View 
 
objectives of the testing is to assure that the OMS-E can be 
safely operated with the PQM.  Testing will also demonstrate 
that the PQM can set the proper upstream pressures and 
temperatures for the OMS-E to operate nominally given the 
PQM has never been tested in hot-fire operation with OMS-E 
before.  In order to safely conduct the test campaign, hardware 
such as the engine subassembly, fluid feed lines, valves, 
electrical power lines, instrumentation, stiff links, installation 
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) [1], and diffuser [whose 
objectives are to collect the exhaust of the OMS-E to actively 
cool down the exhaust gases, reduce thermal exchanges, and 
create a vacuum at OMS-E level before igniting], had to be 
analyzed for any hazards and failure modes. 
     As with most Manned Spaceflight vehicle development 
programs, the planned test schedule was impacted by multiple 
delays that limited the time available for analysis.  This paper 
describes NASA’s process, governed by the Multi-Purpose 
Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Program Requirements, for efficiently 
considering all failure modes of all flight hardware and Flight 
Critical GSE.  Although the PQM Hot-Fire test campaign was 
a ground test campaign, the OMS-E Project performed the 
Safety and Reliability analysis to flight rigor, as well used an 
actual spaceflight asset, OMS-E SN-108, which has flown on 
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31 flights, and has accumulated a total of 162 burns and 4.01 
hours of total burn time.  A process called Initial Criticality 
Assessment (ICA) was used, similar to a triage process, in order 
to arrive at required FMEAs.  The ICA allows for more efficient 
use of limited time by focusing the analyst’s efforts on high 
criticality potential failures. 
     The goal of an Initial Criticality Assessment (ICA) for flight 
hardware, and flight critical GSE, is to assess each function, and 
to determine if loss or degraded performance of the function 
could result in: loss of life and/or loss of flight vehicle 
(Criticality 1); damage to a flight vehicle system; or Loss of 
Mission (Criticality 2) if not detected and corrected.  The 
analyst then ranked the impact of that hardware on Safety and 
Reliability.  Crit 1 and Crit 2 flight hardware and flight critical 
GSE on OMS-E then had detailed FMEAs created whereas Crit 
3 (defined as all other failures not covered by Criticalities 1 and 
2) hardware was not further analyzed for Safety and Reliability.  
Although the PQM test campaign was a ground test and not a 
space flight test, the high energy propellants had the potential 
for loss of a spaceflight asset (the SN-108 engine) in case of a 
catastrophic failure, as well as Loss of Mission because a major 
failure could potentially delay the planned launch date as well 
as the specific mission of the PQM Project.  Figure 2 shows the 
relative size of the PQM as it is being installed in Test Stand 
301 located at the WSTF 
Figure 2: PQM Being Installed at WSTF TS-301 
 
     This paper summarizes the analysis process, presents actual 
ICA forms for the OMS-E hardware, for Crit 1, Crit 2, and Crit 
3; and some selected (but not all) resulting FMEAs for the Crit 
1 and Crit 2 categories.   Also discussed are the lessons learned 
from the analysis and suggestions for improvements to the 
Reliability and Maintainability community.   
 
2 ORION FMEA/CIL REQUIREMENTS 
     The Orion Program has a document [2] governing the 
development of Hardware Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL).  The objective of this 
document is to establish a consistent framework for uniform 
implementation of Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
and Critical Items List (CIL) tasks for the Multi-Purpose 
Crewed Vehicle (MPCV) Program. To fulfill this objective, the 
document defines basic process, ground rules and assumptions, 
data fields, and terminology for performance of the FMEA/CIL 
tasks. The Prime Contractor and Government Furnished 
Equipment (GFE) Flight Projects shall develop the FMEA/CILs 
for their respective hardware. The OMS-E Project is one such 
GFE project within the Orion Program.  The Program is 
responsible for FMEA/CIL methodology guidance, assurance 
that the FMEA specific design guidelines are adequately 
addressed, and the integration of the FMEAs with other 
Programs (such as Space Launch System [SLS] and Ground 
System Development & Operations [GSDO]) where effects or 
causes cross Program interfaces. 
2.1 FMEA/CIL  During the design and development phase 
During the preliminary and detailed design phases, the purpose 
of the FMEA is to provide input to MPCV risk assessment and 
risk management activities and assist in assessing the MPCV 
design’s compliance to design requirements. The CIL process 
was established to assure the advancement of necessary 
engineering hardware controls that are implemented and 
maintained (e.g., design features, tests, inspections, operations 
and process controls), which will ensure that the critical 
hardware will receive the proper focus to support the flight 
mission successfully. 
During the design and development phase, when design criteria, 
mission requirements, and conceptual designs are being 
established, the FMEA is used to evaluate the design approach 
and to compare the benefits of competing design 
configurations. The FMEA provides a systematic identification 
of failure modes for evaluation and identifies potentially critical 
single failure points for possible elimination. The FMEA keeps 
pace with design cycles and requirements in order to maintain 
constant identification and tracking of potential critical failure 
modes. 
The CIL serves as a tool to develop and document the 
engineering hardware controls that are implemented and 
maintained to assure that critical component failure modes are 
well understood and evaluated for proper control of  risk. 
2.2 FMEA/CIL  During the Operations Phase 
     Once the design is baselined, the purpose of the FMEA/CIL 
is fundamentally changed. The FMEA/CILs, formerly tools for 
influencing design, now become tools for documenting the 
requirements needed to control causes of critical failure modes.  
Projects assess all design changes for impact to the FMEA/CIL 
as part of the design change evaluation. This is to assure that 
potential critical failure modes are not introduced without 
Program approval.  If a design change eliminates a critical item, 
the FMEA for the item is updated. If the design change does not 
  
eliminate the critical item, the CIL retention rationale are 
revised as necessary, and program acceptance documentation 
developed. 
     During the operations phase, the status of each CIL item and 
changes are reviewed and approved through the same process 
as the initial CIL.  Projects provide a status of all CIL items as 
part of the Flight Readiness Review (FRR) process and as part 
of the Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR). 
2.3 Initial Criticality Assessment (ICA) 
     Projects perform an Initial Criticality Assessment (ICA) of 
the Flight Critical GSE that are transferred to NASA to assess 
each function and determine if loss or degraded performance of 
the function could result in loss of life, or damage to a flight 
vehicle system which could result in, worst-case, criticality 
category 1 or 2 failures in-flight if not detected and corrected 
prior to launch.  This assessment is performed without regard 
to available redundancy. Standardized ICA forms are provided 
by the MPCV Program.  For those functions determined to be 
non-critical, no further FMEA effort is required, but the Project 
retains the ICA performed on functions determined to be non-
critical as part of the Program documentation.  For those 
functions identified as critical or not covered by an ICA, the 
Project then performs a full FMEA/CIL analysis. 
 
3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF OMS-E SPECIFIC ICA 
     It must be noted that the majority of the PQM testing at 
WSTF is Airbus directed on Airbus owned hardware.  The 
OMS-E specific portion of the testing, also known as a 
“Passenger Test,” is the one exception to this Airbus ownership.  
The OMS-E hardware is NASA property and the test conditions 
are NASA directed.  Therefore the work split was as follows.  
For System Safety and Reliability analysis on the PSS, Airbus 
performed the Hazard Analysis (HA) and FMEAs.  NASA 
WSTF performed the HA and FMEAs on the ground support 
and institutional facilities.  But because the OMS-E is NASA 
owned hardware and Export Control restrictions prevent Airbus 
from knowing all the internal technical details of the engine, it 
was up to the NASA Project to perform the engine specific HA 
and FMEAs. 
3.1 Ground Support Equipment and Test as You Fly  
     In developing ICAs specific to the OMS-E, an interface line 
was drawn between the engine and the Airbus propellant supply 
lines, mechanical interfaces, electrical power & signals, and 
instrumentation, as well as WSTF test instrumentation.       From 
the OMS-Engine perspective, both, WSTF ground test 
instrumentation and Airbus instrumentation and supply lines 
were treated as Ground Support Equipment (GSE).  Again, 
from the engine perspective, the instrumentation lines from 
WSTF as well as all the lines from Airbus are required 
supporting equipment for the OMS-E to function successfully. 
     NASA has a Test Like You Fly (TLYF) philosophy that 
requires a Project to conduct high fidelity ground tests that 
simulate not just the actual spaceflight hardware, but also the 
environments, test conditions, processes, and plans.  Although 
MPCV 70043 only requires the performance of an ICA for 
“flight hardware and NASA developed Flight Critical GSE” it 
was decided to perform these ICAs for the PQM ground test 
campaign in order to conduct the analysis with “Flight Rigor” 
and to protect an actual flight test article, SN 108. 
3.2 Ground Rules and Assumptions 
       Because an FMEA had been performed for the actual 
spaceflight mission [3], only the unique 
interfaces/environments of this PQM ground test article were 
analyzed via HA and FMEA.  Philosophically, the work split 
can be viewed as: Airbus analyzed failures in their propulsion 
system, WSTF analyzed failures in their ground systems, and 
the OMS-E Project analyzed failure propagation at the 
interfaces with the engine. 
    With the above clarifications, the following ICA assumptions 
were in effect: 
1. To be used to help analyze the effects of GSE failure 
during PQM Testing only on the OMS-E. 
2. GSE failure cannot cause harm to anything but the 
OMS-E. 
Each component may have had more component specific 
assumptions applicable to their ICA. 
 
3.3 Analysis Documents and Process 
     Figure 3 shows a close up of many of the components that 
make up the PQM test article: supporting structure, harnesses, 
propellant tanks, Helium (He) pressurization tanks, feed lines, 
Auxiliary thrusters, RCS, etc.  It’s important to state that due to 
US Export Control Laws a full technical diagram for prints of 
the PSS and the OMS-E could not be included in this paper.  In 
addition to PQM and test facility blueprints, the main document 
that was referenced was the OMS-E Delta Qualification Hot-
Fire Test Plan [4].  This document contains engine subassembly 
details, electrical and mechanical interfaces, tables of 
instrumentation, engine firing sequence and facility purges, as 
  
well as facility requirements. 
Figure 3: PQM Propulsion System Components 
 
      Similar to what is typical in the generation of FMEAs, the 
Analyst met with the engine Subject Matter Expert (SME) as 
well as the PQM SME multiple times to determine the Failure 
Modes and Failure Effects of the components being analyzed.  
After these and the associated criticality was determined, a 
larger team review of the draft ICA was conducted before it was 
finalized for release. 
     For those components that were ranked with a criticality of 
3, see Figure 4 as a sample, no further analysis work was 
performed.  The ICA was signed and kept by the Project as a 
formal record that due diligence was indeed performed in 
analyzing the Failure Modes of the specific component.  Note 
that as in an FMEA, the Failure Modes and Failure Effects are 
identified, but no analysis relative to detection, corrective 
action(s), mitigations, etc. are performed.  There is a field 
reserved for Rationale which can be used similarly to the 
Remarks or Comments field in many FMEAs.  This Rational 
field clarifies that no harm to ground test personnel, engine, 
flight crew, or spaceflight mission would occur as a result of a 
failure, but only a loss of test data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Sample ICA for a Pressure Transducer  
 
4 ICA REQUIRING FMEA 
     Those components that were ranked with a criticality of 1 
required a full FMEA be performed.  As an example, because 
of the potential of propellant leakage causing a fire or explosion 
in a high value test facility and test equipment, Figure 5 shows 
one of the Crit 1 ICAs.  Note that the Rationale field makes 
clear that although this is a ground test, and thus no spaceflight 
crew or mission would be lost, the potential damage to the 
facility, equipment, and ground crew is what makes this a 
Criticality 1 failure. 
     Once this Fuel Feed Line Interface Flange was identified as 
being a Crit 1 ICA, the analysis team immediately set out to 
determine if a new dedicated FMEA was required, or if this 
Failure Mode was covered in one of the existing Program 
FMEAs (there are: Spaceflight Mission, Test Facility System, 
& PQM PSS FMEAs).  The team determined that this particular 
Failure Mode and Failure Effect was not covered by the NASA 
created Spaceflight Mission and Test Facility FMEAs. 
      Since the PQM PSS FMEA was owned by Airbus Defence 
and Space, and was being developed concurrently to the ICA 
analysis, the NASA Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) 
team held a telecom with the Airbus R&M team to determine if 
this Failure Mode and Failure Effect in this ICA was covered.   
The detailed review of the Airbus PQM PSS FMEA revealed 
that indeed it was addressed and thus a new NASA FMEA 
would not be required. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Sample ICA for the Fuel Feed Flange 
 
5 LESSONS LEARNED 
     Multiple lessons were learned as a result of this analysis 
work.  One is that because of the inevitable compression of 
available analysis time available prior to the start of major 
ground test campaigns, the use of a screening method (such as 
ICA) to triage the high hazard impact FMEAs from those with 
lower impacts is necessary.  Another Lesson Learned was the 
need to clearly state the ground rules and assumptions driving 
the ICA and FMEA studies.  There were multiple times where 
the ICA failure effects and criticality were changed due to 
updates to the driving ground rules and assumptions. 
The need for continuous communication in an international 
collaborative project such as this is perhaps the most important 
lesson.  As mentioned above, the R&M analyst updated the ICA 
Failure Modes and Effects, as well as Criticalities based on 
multiple meetings with the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) as 
the PQM PSS was being developed and better understood.  
Although mostly out of NASA’s control, a more timely review 
of the Airbus provided PQM PSS FMEA may have negated the 
need for a last minute international telecom to determine if the 
Failure Mode and Effect identified in the ICA was covered. 
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